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The Binding Nature of the Disputes
Settlement Procedure in the Third
U.N. Convention on the Law of the




In 1982, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III) adopted a comprehensive Convention
governing all ocean usages. The Convention contains 15 parts,
320 articles and 9 annexes.' The subjects covered by the Con-
vention include: territorial sea and contiguous zones, straits used
for international navigation, continental shelves, archipelagic
states, exclusive economic zones, high seas, regimes for islands,
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, rights of access of land-locked
states to and from the sea and freedom of transit, seabed re-
source exploitation in an area beyond national jurisdiction, pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment, scientific
marine research, development and transfer of marine technology,
and the settlement of disputes.
A most significant part of the Convention is Part XI, which
deals with the establishment of a regime2 for the International
* Dr. Mahdi EI-Baghdadi is a faculty member of Public Administration and
International Affairs at the Political Science Department, Grambling State University,
Grambling, Louisiana. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Louis
B. Sohn of the University of Georgia, School of Law, for his valuable comment on the
article.
. The Third U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Serial No.8355, U.N.
Sales No. E.93N.5.
2 A regime is a social institution comprising a set of principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue-
area in international relations. For further elaboration of the meaning of regime, see
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 36 (S. Krasner ed. 1982) and R. KEOPHANE and J. NYE,
POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1989).
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Seabed Authority (ISA). The proposed Authority would be a
unique international organization. Its activities would focus on
the exploitation of the polymetallic manganese nodules. The
nodules are mineral resources found in the area beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of nation states. The polymetallic nodules
are mineral resources primarily composed of manganese, copper,
nickel, and cobalt, and other minerals in lesser amounts. Modern
technology has made the exploitation of the nodules technically
feasible.'
Natural resources in general, and seabed resources in partic-
ular, have certain economic structural properties that dominate
their extraction and marketing. The lag of exploitive technologies
behind discovery imbues exploitation of the seas' resources with
a comparatively high level of uncertainty.4 The ISA represents
the first cooperative international endeavor to develop, manage,
regulate, and exploit resources from a domain covering more
than half the earth's surface. To be an effective coping mecha-
nism reflective of the plurality of the values held by the actors,
the ISA has been given authority never before granted to an
The nodules are located on the deep ocean floor that is sometimes called the
abyssal plain. The abyssal plain includes mountain ranges, isolated sea mounts, and
deep trenches. The depth of the oceans where manganese nodules are found falls between
15,000 and 20,000 feet. The nodules vary widely in their composition, physical shape,
and chemical properties. Frequently, their size and shape resemble those of potatoes.
Their total weight can only be speculative and the estimates vary widely. From 1958 to
1959, a group of U.S. scientists at the University of California estimated the total volume
of nodules in the Pacific Ocean alone at 1,700 billion tons. See J. L. MERO, TiE FINDING
AND PROCESSING OF DEEP-SEA MANGANESE NODULES (1959). In 1961, two Soviet scientists
published another estimate for the Pacific, which was only about a twentieth as large,
though still enormous. E. LUARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA-BED 15 (1977). In 1965 Dr.
John Mero, in his pioneering study, indicated that the Pacific Ocean contained over one
trillion tons of the nodules. J. MERO, THE MINERAL REsoURcES OF Tma SEA 121-124
(1965). "Manganese nodules are found in all ocean sediments formed under oxidizing
conditions but they are not uniformly distributed." Id. at 127-129. "Manganese nodules
have been found at a number of locations in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Deposits
of the nodules in these oceans, however, do not seem to be widely spread as in the
Pacific Ocean."Id. at 234. The important point is that the nodules are found almost
everywhere, and the amount of individual metals contained in them include 16.4 billion
tons of nickel, 8 billion tons of copper, and 8.8 billion tons of cobalt. Report of the
U.N. Secretary General, Marine Mineral Resources, U.N. Doc. E/CM20DD5 (1971).
' M. CLEMENT, The Economic Milieu of the Ocean, WHO PROTECTS THE OCEAN?
142 (J. Hargrove ed. 1975). For further information regarding the manganese nodules'
geophysical characteristics and development of ocean knowledge, see J. MERO, THa
MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA (1965); E. LUARD, THE CONTROL OF Ta SEA-BED
(1977); R. OGLEY, INTERNATIONALIZING THE SEABED (1984); V. PRESCOTT, The Deep
Seabed, MARITIME DIMENSION, (R. P. Barston and P. Birnie ed. 1980); 3 THE NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA (1973).
[VOL. 6:173
INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY
international organization and must be guided by the criteria of
both efficiency and equity. This compromise arrangement has
not satisfied all the participants. Developing countries view the
creation of the ISA as part of their effort to establish the New
International Economic Order (NIEO), among whose significant
demands are: participation in the decision-making process con-
cerning international economic issues, obtaining an equitable
share in the benefits accruing from the management of global
goods, and gaining access to technological know-how and sci-
entific knowledge in order to aid in their economic development. 5
While some developed countries have sympathized with these
demands, others, particularly the United States, have opposed
them or expressed reservations.
The U.S. position concerning the ISA can be divided into
three phases. In the initial phase, the U.S. favored the establish-
ment of an agency of simple registry or licensing model that
would provide licenses to qualified contractors and create rules
for mining on the basis of first come, first registered. In that
phase, the U.S. did not envisage the establishment of an ISA
that would itself engage in mining activities. This position was
expressed along with other positions contained in a number of
proposals tabled before the Seabed Committee in 1970 and 1971
as a basis to negotiate a regime for the deep seabed and its
resources. 6 The second phase of the U.S. position is characterized
by flexibility and compromise. As a result of the impact of
political socialization and evolutionary learning process, a shift
occurred in the Geneva session of UNCLOS III in 1975. In that
session the U.S. proposed what came to be known as the parallel
See, e.g., P. N. AGARWALA, TnE NEW INTERNATIONAL EcoNobac ORDER, (1983);
B. GONOWIC, UNCTAD CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE, 8-27 (1972); P. PREBISH, Capital-
ism: The Second Crisis, TmRD WORLD STRATEGY, (Gauhar ed. 1983); E. EVRrVLADES,
The Third World's Approach to the Deep Seabed, 2 OcEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 207 (1982); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 34-35, tent. draft
no. 6 (1985); E. DEuTscH, AN INTERNATIONAL RUtLE OF LAW 137 (1977).
6 A/A 138/25 of August 3, 1970 (USA); A/AC 138/26 of August 3, 1970, and
A/AC 138/46 of August 3, 1971 (the UK); A/AC 138/27 of August 4, 1970 (France);
A/AC 138/44 of July 20, 1971 (Tanzania); A/AC' 138/43 of July 22, 1971 (USSR); A/
AC 138/44 of August 3, 1971 (Poland); A/AC 138/49 of August 10, 1971 (Chile,
Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, aid Venezuela); A/AC 138/53 of August, 1971 (Malta);
A/AC 138/55 of August 20, 1971 (Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal,
Netherlands, and Singapore); A/AC 138/59 of August 24, 1971 (Canada); and A/AC
138/63 of November 23, 1971 (Japan).
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system.7 The main thrust of the parallel system was to place
seabed mining by states and private corporations on an equal
footing with that of the ISA. This would be achieved by dividing
the area into parts. States and private corporations would have
the exclusive rights to exploit parts, and the ISA, through the
Enterprise, would have the exclusive rights to other parts of
equal value and size. Once a seabed area has been prospected,
a potential mining state or company would present to the ISA
two mine sites of estimated "equal commercial value." The ISA
would choose one site to be mined by the Enterprise, or in
association with developing countries, and enter into a contrac-
tual agreement with the miner for the other site. In its original
form, the parallel system did not meet the satisfaction of the
developing countries. A basic corollary of the developing coun-
tries position was the assured access to marine technology and
the availability of financing for practical operation of the En-
terprise. To allay their fears, the U.S. in 1976 put forth a
package designed to win support for the parallel system. How-
ever, a new third phase of U.S. decision-making began with the
presidential election of 1980. When President Reagan came into
office, he called for a suspension of further negotiations while
his Administration conducted a thorough policy review of the
proposed Convention on the Law of the Sea. The result of this
process was inflexibility in the U.S. stance and unwillingness to
accept the consensus that had emerged at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Because the policy
review was not completed until January, 1982, the U.S. did not
effectively participate in the Tenth Resumed Session of UNCLOS
III.
The main U.S. concerns on deep seabed mining, as explained
in the working paper, "Approaches to Major Problems in Part
XI of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea", included:
decision-making by the ISA Council, the mining system, the
status of the Enterprise, transfer of technology, the review con-
ference, production limitations, grandfather rights, and the na-
tional liberation movements. The subsequent U.S. proposals for
amendments to the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, as
7 See Status Report on the Law of the Sea Conference: Hearings before the Sen.
Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
8 Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, THE LAw OF THE SEA: A TEST
OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1976).
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presented in what came to be called the "Green Book" to the
Eleventh Session, were considered by the group of the developing
countries as a reversal of position and an attempt to rewrite the
deep seabed provisions. 9 In a post-conference policy review,
which was concluded on July 9, 1982, President Reagan an-
nounced that the U.S. would not sign the Convention and would
limit its participation in the remaining conference process at the
technical level and with regard to provisions that serve the U.S.
interests. 0
In spite of some changes to accommodate it, the U.S. could
not be swayed and insisted on abandoning consensus when it
called for a recorded vote and voted negatively on April 30,
1982, on the Draft Convention, together with the mentioned
resolutions, which form an integral whole. Thereafter, the U.S.
pushed for the signing of a Reciprocating States Agreement
among like-minded industrial states. The U.S. has also refrained
from participating in the work of the International Seabed Com-
mission and for the International Seabed Authority for the Law
of the Sea." Where the main thrust of the developing countries'
argument is "equity", the gist of the developed countries' ar-
gument focuses on "efficiency" .12
To ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of
the different regimes of the Convention, especially the ISA re-
gime, the participants at UNCLOS III established a reasonably
precise and concrete procedure for disputes resolution. The pro-
visions of this procedure are intricately interwoven into the
structure of the Convention. A distinguishing characteristic of
the disputes settlement procedure of the ISA is the nature of its
9 See U.S. Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 371, LAW OF THE SEA, (1982).
,0 U.S. Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 416, LAW OF THE SEA AND OCEANS
PoLicY (1982).
" No change has taken place on the U.S. position concerning the ISA during the
Bush Administration. It is hoped, however, that when the agenda in Washington becomes
less crowded with hot political issues, the question of the ISA will be more favorably
handled. This hope is based on the increasing interest recently expressed by the Admin-
istration to establish a new international order on the basis of enhancing the role of
international organizations in international relations. See generally, J. BUtKENEus, DEEP
SEABED RESOURCES: PoLrrics AND TECHNOLOGY (1979); R. OGLEY, INTERNATIONALIZING
THE SEABED (1984).
12 E. J. MissAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS 5 (1969); A. OxuN, EQUAITnY AND En-
ciENcY: TmE Bio TRADEOF 41 (1975); E. LuARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEABED 15
(1977); J. BARKENBUS, DEEP SEABED RESOURCES: PoLrTcs AND TECHNOLOOY (1979); W.
OSTRENG, NORWAY'S LAW OF THE SEA POLICY IN THE 1970's (1982). R. OGLEY, INTER-
NATIONALIZING THE SEABED 144 (1984).
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binding jurisdiction. This, of course, represents a departure from
what has been traditionally accepted in international law. 3
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the relevant provi-
sions of the disputes settlement procedures of the Convention
and to attempt to show how the dispute settlement procedures
in Parts XI and XV of the Third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea are characterized by binding jurisdiction.
It will also show that the disputes settlement mechanisms con-
cerning the ISA activities as included in Part XI have binding
jurisdiction and that Part XI gives the parties a choice between
four different tribunals to settle disputes. If the parties fail to
agree on a common choice, either party can submit the dispute
to arbitration. The award of the tribunal is final and the parties
must comply with it. Most disputes relating to navigation and
environment are subject to binding decisions. However, there
are exceptions. These exceptions relate to disputes concerning
fishing and scientific research in the exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf and disputes relating to boundaries, and mili-
tary activities or disputes before the U.N. Security Council.
The outcome of the disputes settlement procedures in Parts
XV and XI of the Convention is a compromise serving the
interests of the proponents of efficiency and equity. To support
this thesis, an attempt is made to make a textual analysis of the
relevant provisions of the Convention and to draw on U.N.
documents and secondary sources concerning the subject.
EVALUATION OF THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF DISPUTES
SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Parts XV and XI of the Convention deal with disputes
settlement procedures. Part XV contains Articles 279-296 and
focuses on resolution of general disputes that emanate from the
different usages of the oceans except the seabed. Part XI em-
bodies Articles 186-191 and concentrates on settling disputes
arising from seabed activities. The general disputes settlement
provisions in Part XV provide the states that are part of the
Convention with three options from which they can choose a
" The traditional norms and practices of international law require the acquiescence
of a party to a dispute before any recourse to adjudication is made. In Article 287(2)
of the Convention of UNCLOS III, however, there is emphasis on the "obligation of a
State Party to accept the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber."
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dispute settlement method. The first option is provided in Arti-
cles 279, 280 and 281. According to these Articles, states can
seek a method to settle disputes by negotiation, arbitration,
judicial means, or other "peaceful means of their own choice'
when the dispute arises. 14 The second option is provided in
Article 282. It stipulates that if states which are parties to a
dispute have agreed to a general, regional or bilateral agreement
in a disputes settlement procedure that entails a binding decision,
then that procedure shall apply unless the parties to the dispute
otherwise agree. It is evident that this Article allows parties to
a dispute to have some kind of agreement as to compulsory
jurisdiction before a dispute in fact arises. The third option is
provided by Article 286. This Article allows states who have not
selected a method for dispute settlement under the previous
options to submit "at the request of the party to the dispute to
the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under" the compulsory
jurisdiction section. Under Article 287 a state acceding to the
Convention may declare as applicable to the disputes settlement
one of the following four procedures:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
(b) the International Court of Justice,
(c) the arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex
VII,
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VIII of the Convention.
While provided with different options from which they can
choose a method to resolve disputes, states that are parties to
the Convention are obligated under Article 283 to proceed ex-
peditiously to an exchange of views when a dispute arises be-
tween them so as to agree "on the manner of implementing the
settlement." If no agreement is reached, any party to the dispute
may submit it to arbitration under Article 287(5). Meanwhile,
Annex VII in Article II makes it clear that the tribunal's award
is final and that the parties must comply with it. All disputes
relating to navigation and environment are thus subject to bind-
ing decision-making. However, Article 297 provides exceptions
concerning some disputes relating to fishing and scientific re-
search in the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and
" See Articles 279, 280 and 281 of Third U.N. Convention on the Law of the
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Article 298(1)(c) provides exceptions for disputes before the U.N.
Security Council.
Regarding the relevant provisions of disputes settlement within
Part XI of the Convention, the language is very clear. The
Convention requires that any disputes settlement procedure pro-
vide a binding decision. In fact, Article 287(2) of the Convention
takes the ISA out of the general dispute settlement provisions
of Part XV. Perhaps a significant aspect in the dispute resolution
procedure of the Convention is the binding nature of jurisdiction
concerning settlement of disputes arising from activities in the
area. A state is not free to choose a method for settlement of
disputes where they relate to activities in the area. The Seabed
Disputes Chamber is given jurisdiction over disputes arising out
of the activities of the area in accordance with Article 287(2)
which requires the separateness of the "obligation of a State
Party to accept the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the
extent and in the manner provided for in Part XI, Section 5."
In other words, the reference is to binding jurisdiction under the
Seabed dispute resolution provisions of Articles 186-196. In this
regard, Article 187 specifically stipulates, "the Seabed Disputes
Chamber shall have jurisdiction ...with respect to activities in
the Area," over conflicts involving states, conflicts involving
states and the ISA, and any other parties to a "contract relating
to activities in the Area." It should be noted, however, that
states involved in a dispute are also permitted under Part XI,
Section 5, Article 188(l)(a) to submit such disputes to a special
chamber of the full International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea.
The characteristic of binding jurisdiction is reiterated in Ar-
ticle 188(2)(a) when it is stipulated that disputes relating to
contracts in regard to activities in the area, "shall be submitted
at the request of any party to the dispute to binding commercial
arbitration, unless the parties otherwise agree." Moreover, "when
the dispute also involves a question of the interpretation of Part
XI and the Annexes relating thereto, with respect to activities in
the Area, that question shall be referred to the Seabed Disputes
Chamber for a ruling."
While the provisions of Part XI relating to disputes settle-
ment contain explicit and precise language of binding jurisdic-
tion, they do not contain clear language providing for binding
decisions. Nevertheless, when reading Part XI in conjunction
[VOL. 6:173
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with Part XV it would seem that Article 296 would apply.
Paragraph I of Article 296 stipulates that "[any decision ren-
dered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section
shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to
the dispute." While the reference is made in Article 287(2) to
the "obligation of a State Party to accept the jurisdiction of the
Seabed Disputes Chamber," the Seabed Disputes Chamber is
provided with jurisdiction under Article 186. Since the value of
binding jurisdiction is minimized in the absence of binding de-
cisions, Article 39 of Annex VI (which is incorporated as part
of the dispute settlement mechanism under Part XI through
Article 186) has made it clear that "the decisions of the Seabed
Disputes Chamber shall be enforceable in the territories of the
States. Parties in the same manner as judgments or orders of
the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the en-
forcement is sought."
This explicit and concrete procedure with binding jurisdiction
to settle disputes within the ISA is a departure from the custom-
ary procedure to settle international disputes. According to the
current procedure, disputes are often allowed to drag on and
become inflamed so that they are very difficult to resolve. The
absence of adequate jurisdictional arrangements for execution
and reporting have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the
current procedure." However, the Seabed Disputes Chamber
procedure has been strengthened by granting authority to the
Legal and Technical Commission which under Article 1650) is
made responsible to monitor and "make recommendations to
the Council with respect to measures to be taken upon a decision
by the Seabed Chamber."
CONCLUSION
Participants in UNCLOS III "pursued codification and de-
velopment of international law because they sought greater pre-
cision in the norms devised to regulate particular types of
behavior.' ' 6 Proponents of efficiency wanted to establish order,
stability, predictability, and certainty to protect their investments
11 L. SoHN, The Security Council's Role in the Settlement of International Dis-
putes, 18 Am. J. oF INT'L LAW 403 (1984). See also, L. SoHN, Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does UNCLOS III Point the Way?, 46 LAW AND CONTEM-
PORARY PROBLEMS 200 (1983).
" E. MIES, Law of the Sea Institute Annual Conference 1 (1980).
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in deep seabed mining. Proponents of equity, however, wanted
to establish fairness, justice, and reasonableness so as to gain
power and status in the decision-making processes of interna-
tional economic relationships, to obtain wealth and income from
the distribution of global commons, and to acquire technological
know-how to help them in the developmental processes of their
economies. The outcome is neither "Pareto Optimality" nor an
ideal type of equity. It is a compromise between efficiency and
equity involving trade-offs, accommodations and balances. This
was made possible by agreement to accept various means for
settling disputes. The compulsory disputes settlement procedure
is envisaged to serve both efficiency and equity. Those interested
in efficiency will have protection for "the overall security, eco-
nomic and environmental interests in accordance with the re-
quirements of the Convention regarding navigation, overflight,
pollution," and against occasional temptation on the part of the
United States to set adverse precedents by doing otherwise. 7 The
compromise serves the collective interests of the developed coun-
tries in economic efficiency and also meets the equity objectives
of the developing countries by providing universally applicable
rules in accordance with Article 293 of the Convention.
The disputes settlement procedure in Part XI provides for
binding jurisdiction. However, Part XV also gives the states a
choice between four different tribunals. Either party to a dispute
can submit it to arbitration and the decision will be final and
obligatory. Disputes relating to navigation and environment are
subject to binding decision-making. But some exceptions are
provided. These exceptions relate to disputes concerning fishing
and scientific research in the exclusive economic zone or conti-
nental shelf and disputes related to boundaries, and military
activities or disputes before the U.N. Security Council. Both
Parts XI and XV of the Convention have binding character to
settle disputes. The difference between them, however, is that
XV applies to the states only, while XI also applies to interna-
tional organizations, corporations and even individuals.
The binding character of the disputes settlement procedures
of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
represents a significant departure from the traditional pattern of
solving international disputes. This will induce greater self-re-




straint, encourage states to seek legal advice before acting, and
compel international lawyers to be cautious in their advice., 8
This procedure will also provide a state with a graceful retreat.
If it acts in violation of the rules, it need not yield to pressure
from another state, but only the binding judgment of a disin-
terested tribunal. Likewise a state that is confident it is acting
within its rights may seek a judgment vindicating its actions. 9
1s Id.
19 Id.
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